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CHAPTER 9 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
WILLIAM J. GREENLER, JR. 
A. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
§9.I. Divorce: Cruel and abnsive treatment. In the 1954 SURVEY! 
there was mentioned a possible trend in the form of a stiffening atti-
tude of the court toward divorce. Further confirmation of such a 
trend may be found in the opinion in Souza v. Souza.2 In the Souza 
case a wife, married for twenty-five years, sued for divorce alleging 
cruel and abusive treatment. The findings were, in substance, that 
her husband had learned that she had incurred indebtedness for some 
furniture, and when, being confronted with this, she denied it, he lost 
his head and slapped her on the back. The slap left no mark, and 
caused no fear on her part. There was no other cruelty found. De-
nial of the divorce by the probate judge was upheld, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court observing that the "provocation" tended to "mitigate the 
effect" of the slap. 
The case cannot, of course, be said to be inconsistent with prior de-
cisions such as Mooney v. Mooney,3 wherein a single act of cruelty was 
held as a matter of law to require a divorce, because the cruelty in the 
Mooney case, even though limited to one isolated occurrence, was 
nevertheless more severe than that in the Souza case. Thoughtful 
comparison may well be made, however, between the tenor of this de-
cision and those of Sylvester v. Sylvester4 and Adams v. Adams,5 which 
prompted us to suggest the trend in the Court's attitude. 
§9.2. Coverture: Recovery for loss of services of wife. In the case 
of Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc.,! one question was the right of a sur-
viving husband to recover for loss of services consequent upon the 
WILLIAM J. GREENLER, JR., is Assistant Register of Probate for Essex County, Massa-
chusetts. He is a member of the Massachusetts and Essex County Bar Associations. 
§9.1. 1 See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.3. 
2332 Mass. 316, 125 N.E.2d 120 (1955). 
3317 Mass. 433, 58 N.E.2d 748 (1944). 
4330 Mass. 397, 113 N.E.2d 830 (1953). 
5331 Mass. 354, 118 N.E.2d 759 (1954). 
§9.2. 1332 Mass. 267, 124 N.E.2d 505 (1955). 
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tortious death of his wife, under the wrongful death law then in force2 
which provided for assessment of damages for death according to pe-
cuniary loss sustained by the parties entitled to recover. Upon evidence 
that the deceased wife was fifty-three years old, performed all the usual 
household duties, covered the telephone for her physician husband 
and at times made appointments for him and helped patients locate 
him, the Court ruled that "pecuniary loss" within the statute could be 
found, and upheld a finding for the plaintiff. In so deciding, how-
ever, the Court based its ruling upon the statute, which is construed to 
permit recovery for pecuniary loss even though the services lost were 
gratuitous. 3 The Court clearly pointed out the development, resulting 
from modern statutes enlarging the rights of married women, of the 
proposition that a married woman is no longer under any legal obliga-
tion to perform services for her husband, nor has he any right to her 
earnings; so that in a common law action he cannot recover for loss of 
her services, nor for loss of her earning capacity. She is, on the other 
hand, entitled to such recovery in her own right, and there cannot be 
a double recovery. It was observed that there could be no double re-
covery under the wrongful death statute, because of course the de-
ceased cannot be a plaintiff. 
B. ADOPTIONS, PLACEMENT, AND CARE 
OF CHILDREN 
§9.3. The religious question: Duarte case. In Duarte, Petitioner,1 
decided late in 1954, a factual situation somewhat similar to that in 
the now famous Goldman cases,2 discussed at length in the 1954 SUR-
VEY,3 was presented. As in the Goldman cases, the natural mother 
consented to the adoption, but the adopting petitioners were of a dif-
ferent religious faith than that of the child's mother, and the provi-
sions of C.L., c. 210, §5B were applied.4 Under that statute, the court 
must give custody, when "practicable," to persons of the same religious 
faith as that of the child. When in dispute, the religion of the child 
is taken to be that of the mother. The Probate Court denied the 
adoption, but, instead of hearing evidence as was done in the Goldman 
cases, took judicial notice of the fact that in the predominantly Cath-
olic community there were pending many applications for placement 
of children in homes of the Catholic faith, that of the mother,5 which 
2 G.L., c. 229, §2, as inserted by Acts of 1947, c. 506, §lA. 
3 Following Durd1e v. Baron, 328 Mass. 460, 104 N.E.2d 421 (1952). In that case 
daughters who were not dependent were allowed to recover because the deceased 
father customarily made gifts to them of sums of money. 
§9.3. 1331 Mass. 747, 122 N.E.2d 890 (1954). 
2 Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 
942 (1955). 
31954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.10, 13.6. 
4 Acts of 1950, c. 737, §3. 
5 The natural mother consented to the adoption, as in the Goldman case. 
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could supply the necessary physical and spiritual requirements, and 
that it was therefore "practicable" as required by the statute to give 
custody to persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the judge had no right to 
take judicial notice of such facts, even though he may have had per-
sonal knowledge of them, since they were not matters of "knowledge 
by notoriety" as distinguished from knowledge by individual observa-
tion. The case was remanded for determination of the question of 
the suitability of the petitioners, which did not appear in the record. 
It was apparently not left open to determine upon evidence the ques· 
tion of which the judge had -made a determination upon judicial no-
tice; the only question left open upon the record as presented was the 
suitability of the petitioners apart from the religious diversity. (We 
are informed that the judge in Bristol County, after the remand, 
promptly granted the adoption. This of course he would have to do 
unless he found the petitioners unsuitable.) 
§9.4. The Goldman and GaIly cases distinguished. Though at first 
impression the Duarte case may seem inconsistent with the Gally casel 
on the one hand and the Goldman cases2 on the other, it is not in ac-
tual conflict with either. In the Gally case it had been ruled that since 
it did not appear by evidence that adoptive homes were available of 
the same religious faith, it could not be said to be "practicable" to 
place the child within its own religion and to deny an adoption into 
another. In the Goldman case the converse appeared. There was evi-
dence, and a finding, that there were in the vicinity many available 
adoptive homes of the same religious faith and equal material advan-
tages, so that a finding was warranted that it was "practicable" to place 
the child within its own faith and that the adoption was therefore 
properly denied. But in the Daurte case there was no evidence sub-
mitted on the point. The judge made the finding by taking judicial 
notice. In holding merely that the facts were not the proper subject 
of judicial notice, the Court was not withdrawing from its position 
taken in either of the other two cases. 
§9.5. The Ellis case. A further development presenting a still 
different aspect of the religious problem occurred in the case of Ellis 
v. McCoyl originating in Norfolk County. In this case, much publi-
cized in the local and even national press, the history was strikingly 
similar to that in the Goldman case, in that an unmarried Catholic 
mother consented to the placement of her child by her doctor, which 
in fact resulted in a placement with a Jewish family. The facts dis-
closed that subsequent to the child's birth the mother signed a petition 
for adoption, thereby consenting to it. There is conflicting evidence as 
to whether the mother at this time knew of the petitioners' religion.2 
§9.4. I Petition of GaIly. 329 Mass. 143. 107 N.E.2d 21 (1952). 
2 Petitions of Goldman. 331 Mass. 647. 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954). 
§9.5. 1332 Mass. 266. 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955). 
2 Record. p. 131; id. at 91. 92. 
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Petitioners took the child on March 5, 1951, and on March 29 of the 
same year filed the petition for adoption. On June 9, 1953, respond-
ent filed a motion to strike out her consent. The probate judge 
found that the religious issue was the primary reason for respondent's 
objections to the adoption. Respondent does not want the child re-
turned to her but placed where she will be brought up a Catholic. 
The probate judge allowed the motion to withdraw consent to the 
adoption holding that the mother's objection based on G.L., c. 210, 
§5B was sufficient "cause" for revocation of her consent. Petitioners 
relied heavily on the proposition that consent once voluntarily given 
with full understanding of every fact necessary to such consent cannot 
be withdrawn. In Wyness v. Crowley3 cited by petitioners there was 
no reason given for the attempted revocation by the mother. The 
Probate Court cited English authorities holding that consent once 
given cannot arbitrarily be withdrawn.4 The Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the Probate Court's ruling holding that consent could be 
withdrawn for proper cause and that such was found here. A look at 
other jurisdictions reveals that a majority of the courts that have de-
cided the question have concluded that consent once voluntarily given 
may be revoked.5 It would seem from a study of the cases6 that Mas-
sachusetts does not prohibit the revocation of consent to an adoption 
but holds that such revocation may not be arbitrary but rather must 
be for good cause as determined by the probate judge. 
The result of the Ellis case would therefore seem to be that the re-
ligious requirement expressed in Section 5B may be used as a basis for 
withdrawal of the mother's consent before an adoption is approved by 
the Probate Court just as it must be considered on the merits of the 
adoption as in the Goldman case. It should also be noted that this 
would be true even though the mother knew of the fact of a religious 
difference between her and the adopting parents at the time of giving 
the original consent. 
§9.6. Adoptions: Legislative changes. The lawl passed in the 1954 
SURVEY year stiffening the requirements relative to adoptions and en-
larging the powers of the Department of Public Welfare relative 
thereto was originally operative upon all decrees entered after its ef-
fective date. In response to many complaints the legislature modified 
this to provide that the act should not apply to petitions already on 
3292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E. 758 (1935). 
4 In re West Devon Great Consolo Mine, 38 Ch. D. 51, 54 (1888); Holt v. Jesse, 3 
Ch. D. 177 (1876). 
5 Rhodes v. Shirley, 124 N.E.2d 865 (Ind. 1955); Skagg v. Gannon, 293 Ky. 795,170 
S.W.2d 12 (1943); In re White's Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579, 138 A.L.R. 
1034 (1942); In re Adoption of McKinzie, 275 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1949); Williams v. 
Capporelli, 180 Ore. 41, 175 P.2d 153 (1946); Fitts v. Carpenter, 124 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1939); In re Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748 (1929). 
6 Kalika v. Munro, 323 Mass. 542, 83 N.E.2d 172 (1948), citing Erickson v. Rasp-
perry, 320 Mass. 333, 335, 69 N.E.2d 474, 475 (1946); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 
461, 198 N.E. 758 (1935). 
§9.6. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 646. See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.11, 11.12. 
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file and pending when it took effect.2 Another 1955 enactment3 pro-
vided for the dispensing with a necessary consent where the person has 
been imprisoned in a penal institution for a term of which three years 
remain unexpired at the date of the petition for adoption, without 
restriction as to the place of confinement. Previously the law rec-
ognized only an imprisonment within the Commonwealth. 
Chapter 107 of the Acts of 1955 modifies the mechanical procedure 
in adoptions to some extent. It is now provided that the adopting 
petitioners must file an affidavit with the Probate Court, giving sub-
stantially the same information as they would give to the city clerk in 
reporting the birth of a natural child. Upon decree, the registry of 
probate makes up a certificate of adoption including all the pertinent 
facts concerning the adoptive and adopted persons, except that in-
formation regarding the natural parents of the child is omitted where 
the child was born out of wedlock. If the adopting parents return this 
certificate, signing the written request included thereon, the registry of 
probate sends a copy to the clerk of the city where the adopted person 
was born. His birth record is then altered to conform with the adop-
tion certificate and a new birth certificate may be obtained where it 
will appear as if the person were the natural child of the adopting 
petitioners. 
§9.7. Legislation on support of parents. The amount of income 
of a child which is to be exempted in calculating his liability for sup-
port of indigent parents under G.L., c. 118D was increased by a 1955 
law1 as follows: unmarried child living with parents, from $1500 to 
$2000; unmarried child living apart from parents, from $1750 to 
$2250; married child, from $2750 to $3250. This is obviously in 
keeping with the increased cost of his own support and the greater 
need for the exemption. 
§9.8. Support of parents under old-age assistance law. Various 
provisions of the statutes relative to the support of aged and indigent 
parents by their children are brought together and applied in Spring-
field v. Siderlund.1 In that case the city had rendered old-age assist-
ance under G.L., c. ll8A to the aged mother of the respondent. 
This petition was brought by the city in the Probate Court under 
G.L., c. I 17, §7. The formula2 providing that $2000 per annum shall 
2 Acts of 1955, c. 117. There still may arise a question hereunder as unofficial pub-
lications have already expressed different opinions as to the effective date of the 1954 
law. An ordinary law takes effect ninety days after its approval unless otherwise 
provided. But a law not the subject of a referendum petition takes effect in thirty 
days. Among laws excluded from referendum are laws that "relate to religion, re-
ligious practices or religious institutions" and "To the powers ... of courts ... " 
(G.L., c. 4, §l; Mass. Const., Amend. Art. XLVIII, subds. I, III). If the law in ques-
tion can be included in one of these latter descriptions, it took effect on July 10, 
1954, otherwise, on September 8, 1954. 
3 Acts of 1955, c. 89, amending G.L., c. 210, §3. 
§9.7. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 492, amending G.L., c. 1I8D. 
§9.8. 1332 Mass. 7, 122 N.E.2d 898 (1954). 
2 G.L., c. liSA, §2A. 
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be exempt and one third of the excess income be assessable would 
have here resulted in an assessment greater than the amount paid by 
the city. The judge assessed the respondent for the amount actually 
paid, and ordered execution to issue. It was observed that Section 7 
provides that the judge upon complaint of "any town" may assess such 
amount "as he considers reasonable." The Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the probate judge's decree. A point worth mentioning, al-
though not treated as an issue, is that the assessment, although sought 
for to reimburse the city for aid rendered during a nine-month period 
ending in August, 1953, was based upon the respondent's "per an-
num" earnings for one year ending in August, 1953, instead of being 
based either upon the last calendar year or upon the rate of earnings 
during the nine months in question. 
§9.9. Interstate compacts on juveniles. The General Court in 1955 
enacted a law authorizing the Governor to enter into compacts with 
other states regarding cooperation in the care, assistance and return 
of delinquent children and runaways.1 A form of compact substan-
tially to be followed is written into the law. Wherever such a compact 
may be in force, provision is made for the demand for the return of 
runaways. This is accomplished upon petition by the parent, guard-
ian, or custodian to the "appropriate" court for a requisition. The 
court must determine whether the juvenile is an emancipated minor 
or should be returned to the custody of the petitioner. If the court re-
quires return, it must issue a requisition containing the findings and 
directed to the proper authorities in the state where the child has 
gone. There, the juvenile will be apprehended and detained while 
he is given a hearing, and counselor a guardian ad litem may be pro-
vided. After hearing he may be delivered to an officer appointed by 
the demanding state for the purpose of return. Similar provisions are 
made for the return of escapees and absconders who have violated pro-
bation or parole or escaped from custody. Escapees may also be taken 
into custody wherever found, without waiting for a requisition from 
the state from which they have escaped. Further provisions are made 
for the cooperative supervision of probationers and parolees between 
compact states: chiefly, of course, where the parent or other custodian 
is located in another such state, but providing also for voluntary ac-
ceptance by another state in any other appropriate case. Obviously 
this law will depend for its effect entirely upon its implementation. 
The mechanics of procedure are only outlined in the enabling act, but 
the administrative officer, appointed by the Governor, is given power to 
prescribe rules and regulations. Though it is far too early to appraise 
either the extent or the success of its use, the law is clearly of broad 
potential scope. 
§9.9. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 687. 
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